Executive Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations in the Pnp-boi Report on the Mamasapano Incident

Following are the complete texts of the Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recomendations contained in the Philippine National Police - Board of Inquiry report on the Jan. 25 2015 Mamasapano incident:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 25, 2015, sixty-seven (67) Filipinos died in Mamasapano, Maguindanao as a result of an encounter triggered by Operation Plan (Oplan) Exodus.

The goal of Oplan Exodus was to neutralize high value targets (HVTs) who were International terrorists-i.e., Zhulkifli Bin Hir/Zulkifli Abhir (Marwan); Ahmad Akmad Batabol Usman (Usman); and Amin Baco (Jihad).

Forty-four (44) members of the Special Action Force (SAF)-Considered as the elite unit of the Philippine National Police (PNP) against terrorism and internal security threats-lost their lives in Mamasapano, while sixteen (16) other SAF members sustained severe injuries.

The tragic incident in Mamasapano raised several questions. How could a group of elite forces be massacred? Who was responsible for their deaths? What caused the tragic encounter in Mamasapano? Who were the hostile forces encountered by the SAF troops?

The Board of Inquiry (BOI) was created by the Philippine National Police (PNP) primarily to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the Mamasapano encounter, to establish facts regarding Oplan Exodus, to determine possible lapses in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus, and to provide recommendations in order to address such possible lapses.

The methodology used by the BOI in preparing this Report is described in Chapter 1.

The BOI notes that information obtained from certain key personalities were limited. For instance, the BOI failed to secure an interview with President Benigno Aquino III, suspected Chief PNP (CPNP) Alan Purisima, Chief-of-Staff AFP (CSAFP) General Gregorio Catapang, and Lieutenant General Rustico Guerrero. All concerned officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) refused to be interviewed by the BOI despite repeated requests.

The BOI did not have access to other crucial information such as contents of Short Messaging System (SMS) of text messages, and logs of calls and SMS, BOIs request for the submission of cellular phones for forensic examination were also denied by CSAFP Catapang, Guerrero, suspended CPNP Purisima and AFP officers. However, the sworn statement of suspended CPNP Purisima included a transcript of his SMS exchanges with the President on January 25, 2015.

Despite the foregoing limitations, the BOI succeeded in conducting several interviews, obtaining various types of evidence, processing and reviewing hundreds of documents, and conducting ocular inspection in Mamasapano to produce this Report.

Based on the records, Oplan Exodus was approved by the President and implemented by suspended CPNP Purisima and the Director of SAF (Napenas) Getulio Napenas, to the exclusion of the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine National Police (OIC PNP) Leonardo Espina, who is the concurrent Deputy CPNP for Operations.

On December 16, 2014, the OIC-PNP issued Special Order No. 9851 which directed suspended CPNP Purisima and other suspended PNP officers, to " cease and desists from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices during the pendency of [their respective cases filed by the Ombudsman] until its termination."

Napenas and suspended CPNP Purisima ignored the established PNP Chain of Command by excluding OIC-PNP Espina in the planning and execution of Oplan Exodus. Napenas and suspended CPNP also failed to inform the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government (SILG) Mar Roxas about Oplan Exodus, and made no prior coordination with the AFP. Based on the records, SILG and OIC-PNP were informed of Oplan Exodus only in the morning of January 25, 2015 when such operation was already being executed. OIC-PNP was first informed about Oplan Exodus through a phone call by suspended CPNP Purisima at 05:50 a.m. on January 25, 2015. SILG learned about the operation when he got an SMS from Police Director Charles Calima Jr. at 07:43 a.m. on January 25, 2015.

The participation of the suspended CPNP in Oplan Exodus was carried out with the knowledge of the President. Records revealed instances when the suspended CPNP met with the President and Napenas to discuss Oplan Exodus; and communicated with the President via SMS messages regarding the execution of Oplan Exodus on January 25, 2015.

Records also show that the suspended CPNP Purisima failed to deliver his assurances to coordinate with the AFP. At a crucial stage of the crisis, the suspended CPNP Purisima provided inaccurate information from an unofficial source, which further jeopardized the situation of the 55th SAC and 84th Seaborne in Mamasapano.

There are indications that Napenas may not have considered differing opinions raised by his subordinate commanders. The mission planning appears to have been done by a group of officers and not by a planning team, with inputs heavily influence by Napenas . Subordinate commanders expressed that Napenas had unrealistic planning assumptions such as the swift delivery of artillery fire and the immediate facilitation of ceasefire.

Napenas chose to employ a "way-in/way-out, by foot and night only" infiltration and exfiltration Concept of Operation (CONOPS) for Oplan Exodus. During an interview with BOI, Napenas admitted that he expected casualty of around ten (10) SAF Commandos to accomplish the mission.

Napenas also admitted that key variables for the success of Oplan Exodus, such as the coordination with the Sixth Infantry Division (6ID), and with the Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) and Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG) were not thoroughly considered in the mission planning. The established protocols and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) of the AFP, CCCH and AHJAG in providing reinforcements and effecting ceasefire were not sufficiently discussed.

Napenas proposed to the President the adoption of the "Time-On-Target" (TOT) concept of...